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Abstract. We put forward a plausible explanation of African ﬁnancial
under-development in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. Utilis-
ing an appropriately modiﬁed IO model of banking, we show that the root
of the problem could be unchecked moral hazard (strategic loan defaults)
or adverse selection (a lack of good projects). Applying a dynamic panel
estimator to a large sample of African banks, we show that loan defaults
are a major factor inhibiting bank lending when the quality of regulation
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Africa remains today one of the most ﬁnancially under-developed parts of the world. Fi-
nancial under-development is frequently associated with a country’s inability to mobilise
suﬃcient amounts of saving to satisfy the demand for credit. A recent study by the World
Bank has, however, shown that African banking systems, although lacking in depth com-
pared to other regions in the world, are excessively liquid (Honohan and Beck 2007). That
is to say, savings mobilisation does not appear to represent a binding constraint on African
banks’ ability to lend. Instead, African banks complain of a lack of credit worthy borrowers
while at the same time households and ﬁrms complain about lack of credit. The same study
shows that the least developed banking systems in Africa are also the most liquid, which
implies that resolving the paradox of excess liquidity may hold the key to understanding
African ﬁnancial under-development. To do so requires focussing on the structure and
mechanics of African credit markets.
The main contribution of this paper is to put forward a plausible explanation of African
ﬁnancial under-development in the form of a bad credit market equilibrium. We show that
the root of the problem could be either moral hazard—taking the form of strategic loan
defaults—or adverse selection emanating from the lack of good projects. Theoretically, the
two are almost indistinguishable but we make an attempt to gauge empirically which of
the two is the most likely cause.
The ﬁrst part of the paper is theoretical. It modiﬁes a standard IO model of bank-
ing to analyse the market for bank credit. The model encapsulates various stylised facts
of African credit markets, including high loan default rates. In the model, sub-optimal
equilibria arise when there are severe informational imperfections and institutions intended
to contain moral hazard are weak. In these sub-optimal equilibria, the loan default rate
(an endogenous variable in the model) is high, which deters the expansion of bank credit.
When we use the model to explore the impact of improvements in institutions designed
to mitigate informational imperfections, we ﬁnd important non-linearities in the response
of the banking system. For example, improvements in contract enforcement can reduce
1the impact of loan default on lending, but only when enforcement is low to begin with.
Once the quality of contract enforcement has reached a certain level, further improvements
will have no impact on banks’ behaviour. These results appear in both the moral hazard
and adverse selection versions of the model, and are consistent with the threshold eﬀects
implicit in other macroeconomic studies.
The second part of the paper is empirical. It is aimed at testing various speciﬁc pre-
dictions of the theory utilising panel data for hundreds of African banks over a ten year
period. Speciﬁcally, it explores the relationship between the amount that African banks are
willing to lend, loan default rates and the institutional environment, allowing for threshold
eﬀects.1 The model is ﬁtted using a GMM dynamic panel estimator (Arellano and Bond
1991, Blundell and Bond 1998). Our empirical results provide strong support for the pre-
dictions of our theoretical model, and we are able to identify a threshold eﬀect in regulatory
quality. Moreover, they pass a variety of robustness checks, including sensitivity to diﬀerent
values of the threshold level as well as alternative dynamic panel data estimators. Finally,
we provide some evidence on whether the root cause of ﬁnancial under-development lies in
strategic loan default (moral hazard) or the lack of good projects (adverse selection).
Our paper complements a growing literature on African ﬁnancial systems that is mainly
macroeconomic in approach. Honohan and Beck (2007) provide the starting point for our
paper in the sense that we delve further into some of the issues they raise in their important
World Bank study. More recently, Allen, Otchere and Senbetm (2010) provide a compre-
hensive, thorough and up-to-date overview of African ﬁnancial systems, including banks,
ﬁnancial markets and microﬁnance. Their survey conﬁrms the dominance of traditional
banking over other forms of formal ﬁnance, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It also
highlights the tendency of African banks to invest in government securities but does not
address the factors that explain excess liquidity. Other studies explore the links between
ﬁnancial development and economic growth in Africa. Gries, Kraft and Meierrieks (2009),
1Unlike the bulk of the literature on African ﬁnancial systems that is mainly macroeconomic, our study
uses microeconomic data, allowing to search for threshold eﬀects more directly.
2for example, ﬁnd limited support to the ﬁnance-led growth hypothesis in 16 Sub-Saharan
African countries. Earlier work on a broader range of developing countries by Demetriades
and Law (2006) shows that this is predominantly a feature of low income countries, most
of which are, in fact, located in Sub-Saharan Africa. In middle income countries, some of
which are located in North Africa, the link between ﬁnance and growth is much stronger.2
Similar threshold eﬀects in the ﬁnance-growth relationship have also been documented by
Rioja and Valev (2004). Such macroeconomic eﬀects are consistent with our own ﬁndings
of threshold eﬀects in bank credit that are derived from a micro-setting.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical model and de-
scribes various credit market equilibria under moral hazard and adverse selection. Section
3 outlines the empirical model, describes the data set and explains the estimation method.
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 summarises and concludes.
2 Theory
One of the most important features of African credit markets is that credit registries are ei-
ther completely absent or are in their infancy. The absence of credit registries makes screen-
ing loan applicants extremely challenging. Combined with weak contract enforcement—
another stylised feature of many African economies—this encourages loan default. As we
will see later, variation in regulatory quality across countries and over time is particularly
large in Africa. In this environment, it is no surprise to observe that banks in countries
with weak regulatory institutions are cautious in extending loans and that the default rate
is very high. In the absence of systematic credit history records, default does not have any
impact on credit ratings, and the cost of default to borrowers is relatively low. In these
circumstances, credit markets are prone to an extreme moral hazard problem in the form
of strategic loan defaults: some loan applicants may apply for loans with no intention of
2Demetriades and Law (2006) provide evidence which suggests that in low income countries institutional
quality is a more robust driver of long run growth than ﬁnancial depth.
3ever repaying them. Equally, the diﬃculty of distinguishing successful entrepreneurs from
unsuccessful ones can create an adverse selection eﬀect. Our theoretical model adds to the
existing literature on moral hazard and loan default by exploring in detail how the extent
of contract enforceability and the extent of moral hazard combine to determine the type of
equilibrium prevailing in the loans market. This provides the basis for our empirical model
of bank behaviour in African countries with widely varying levels of regulatory quality.
2.1 Benchmark model of strategic default with identical banks
Our starting point is the “circular city” model of product diﬀerentiation applied to the
lending side of banking.3 n private identical banks compete for loan contracts. The ﬁxed
cost of setting up a bank is F and there are no entry restrictions. Bank i (i = 1, ..., n)
maximises its payoﬀ by setting the lending rate, ri, for all its loan applications. Loan appli-
cants are entrepreneurs that have access to an identical and riskless investment technology,
which gives return R on one unit of invested funds. Entrepreneurs (henceforth, borrowers)
can be either opportunistic, with probability γ (0 < γ < 1), or honest, with probability
1 − γ. The borrower’s type is private information, while the probabilities are common
knowledge. An honest borrower repays his loan without fail, while an opportunistic bor-
rower may choose to either repay or default on his loan, depending on the extent of loan
contract enforcement. If a borrower defaults on his loan, the bank gets compensation d > 0
with probability λ (otherwise, with probability 1 − λ, the bank gets 0). The banks have
access to the following screening technology: when it screens a loan application, the bank
ﬁnds that the applicant is opportunistic with probability σ (0 < σ < 1), otherwise, with
3The model was originally developed by Salop (1979); see also a useful discussion in relation to bank
deposit contracts in Freixas and Rochet (1997). Andrianova, Demetriades and Shortland (2008) extend it
to analyse depositor behaviour in the presence of opportunistic banks and government owned banks. It is
particularly relevant in the African context where product diﬀerentiation can be thought of as representing
a bank’s ethno-linguistic characteristics.
4probability 1 − σ, the bank has no information as to the type of the applicant.4 The bank
may choose to use its screening technology and, having screened all applicants, the bank
can also choose whether to refuse (or not) applications of those borrowers who were ﬂagged
up by screening as opportunistic.5 Borrowers are uniformly distributed along a circle of a
unitary length.6 A borrower incurs a positive transportation cost t which is proportional to
the distance between the depositor and the bank. Every borrower can apply for a loan to
at most one bank. All players are risk-neutral. Every bank has suﬃcient funds to approve
all of its applications if deemed proﬁtable.7
The timing of the game is as follows.
(1) Banks decide whether to enter; n banks enter.
(2) Bank i (i = 1,...,n) sets its lending rate ri.
(3) Each borrower chooses the bank in which to apply for a loan of 1 monetary unit.
(4) Facing the demand for loans, Di, bank i (i = 1, ..., n) chooses whether to screen or
not all of its loan applications.
4We justify this assumption by alluding to a repeated game frame in the background: if a borrower
defaulted on his loan in the past, there may be a record of the default that the bank could learn about
through screening. Honest borrowers don’t have such record, while opportunistic borrowers may or may
not have such record, depending on their past actions. Note that banks cannot share information about
borrowers. The process by which African banks make decisions about individual customers is typically
very opaque, and not documented, so we have no way of modelling information sharing empirically.
5We do not allow the bank to charge a diﬀerent rate for borrowers with a “stained” credit record. Once
the lending rate is posted in order to attract loan applications, the bank cannot decide to charge a higher
rate for borrowers with a poor credit record, but only to refuse credit at the posted rate, which we believe
is plausible.
6For simplicity, let us assume that the distribution density is 1.
7Obviously, this is a simpliﬁcation but not an unreasonable one in the light of Honohan and Beck (2007).
5Figure 1: Structure of the banking industry
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(5) Bank i chooses which applications to approve and which to decline.
(6) A borrower with an approved loan invests his 1 monetary unit and obtains return R.
(7) An honest borrower repays his loan, an opportunistic borrower chooses whether to
repay or default on his loan.
(8) If any of its loans are defaulted on, the bank seeks compensation.
(9) Payoﬀs are realized.
2.2 Solution in the benchmark
Given the sequential nature of the game, the appropriate solution method is backward
induction. Let q ∈ {0,1} represent an opportunistic borrower’s decision to repay his loan
contract where the value of q (q = 1 repay, or q = 0 default) is set by an opportunistic
borrower to maximize his expected payoﬀ. Let ξ ∈ {0,1} denote a bank’s decision to
6screen (ξ = 1 is screen, ξ = 0 is no screen).8 And let p ∈ {0, 1} denote a bank’s decision
to approve all its applications when it decides not to screen.9 The expected payoﬀs of the
players (borrowers and banks) are calculated as follows. By going to bank i, an honest
borrower located at distance xi expects to obtain:
U
1−γ
i = [ξ + (1 − ξ)p][R − ri] − txi (1)




i = [ξ(1 − σ) + (1 − ξ)p][q(R − ri) + (1 − q)(1 − λ)d] − txi (2)
A bank’s expected payoﬀ depends on its choice of actions: screen and ﬁnance those with
apparently clean record, or don’t screen and then either ﬁnance all loan applications or







(1 − γ) + γ(1 − σ)q
￿







(1 − γ) + γq
￿
+ pγ(1 − q)λd + (1 − p)(1 + r0)
oi
(3)
Assumptions we need to have in place here are the following.
Assumption 1 tF 2 > (1 + r0)2 (A1)
(A1) ensures that in the absence of enforcement problems, lending to entrepreneurs is
suﬃciently proﬁtable (ie it must pay oﬀ more than the opportunity cost). We could also
think of this assumption as ensuring a “suﬃcient degree of product diﬀerentiation”, since
t captures the degree of product diﬀerentiation in the model of bank competition.
8As all banks are identical for now, the subscript i is dropped in the notation for probabilities associated
with the banks’ decision-making.
9This economises on notation somewhat, as it can be checked that a bank’s strategy (screen, ﬁnance
all) is dominated by (don’t screen, ﬁnance all), for a non-negative screening cost.




Ft − 1 (A2)
(A2) is simply a participation constraint of the marginal borrower in the absence of en-
forcement problems (ie it ensures a non-negative ex ante expected payoﬀ).
Four types of pure strategy equilibria emerge in this game (see Table 1): “high” equi-
Table 1: Description of equilibria.
Equilibrium Equilibrium behaviour
High (HE) q = 1 (no default) ξ = 0, p = 1 (no screen, ﬁnance all)
Upper Intermediate (IE1) q = 0 (default) ξ = 0, p = 1 (no screen, ﬁnance all)
Lower Intermediate (IE2) q = 0 (default) ξ = 1 (screen, ﬁnance some)
Low (LE) q = 0 (default) ξ = 0, p = 0 (no screen, no ﬁnance)
librium (HE) where all borrowers repay and banks approve all loan application without
resorting to screening, upper intermediate equilibrium (IE1) whereby despite opportunistic
borrowers’ default the banks ﬁnd it proﬁtable to lend to all applicants and avoid screen-
ing, lower intermediate equilibrium (IE2) whereby opportunistic borrowers default, banks
screen and ﬁnance those whose credit record is apparently clean, and ﬁnally “low” equilib-
rium (LE) in which there is no lending at all (banks put their loanable funds into the safe
asset).
Proposition 1 Assume (A1) and (A2). A unique (pure strategy) equilibrium exists and it
is of type:
(i) HE, if λ ≥ ¯ λ. Then ri =
√
Ft − 1and n =
q
t/F;
8(ii) IE1, if λ ≤ λ < ¯ λ. Then ri =
q
Ft/(1 − γ) − 1 −
γ
1−γλd and n =
q
t(1 − γ)/F;
(iii) IE2, if λ < λ, and either γ ≤ ¯ γ, or γ > ¯ γ together with σ > ¯ σ. Then ri =
q
Ft/(1 − γ) − 1 −
γ
1−γ[(1 − σ)λd + σ(1 + r0)] and n =
q
t(1 − γ)/F;
(iv) LE, if λ < λ, γ > ¯ γ and σ ≤ ¯ σ. Then n = D(1 + r0)/F;
where i = 1,...,n, λ = (1 + r0)/d, ¯ λ = (1 + ri)/d, ¯ γ = (ri − r0)/(1 + ri − λd) and
¯ σ = 1 − [(1 − γ)/γ][(ri − r0)/(1 + r0 − λd)] .
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the results contained in Prop. 1.









LE if σ < ¯ σ
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2.3 When banks’ screening technologies diﬀer
We now allow banks to diﬀer in their ability to screen: more established banks may well
have an informational advantage over a “new” bank. Formally and simply, let there be two
9types of banks: the α-type is the bank that has a screening technology as described in the
benchmark section (ﬁnds out about an existing stained credit record with probability σ),
and the β-type is the bank that has a useless screening technology (learns nothing even if
it screens). The proportion of each type of bank (α and β, respectively, with α +β = 1) is
publicly known, but the type itself is private information. Adapting the notation from the
earlier section: ξ is α-bank decision to screen, and pk is k’s bank decision to lend when not
screening (k = {α, β}).
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￿
+ (1 − α)pβ
i







ξ(1 − σ) + (1 − ξ)pα
￿
+ (1 − α)pβ
ih











(1 − γ) + γ(1 − σ)q
￿







(1 − γ) + γq
￿









(1 − γ) + γq
￿
+ pβγ(1 − q)λd + (1 − pβ)(1 + r0)
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(7)
Notice that the equilibria without screening are not aﬀected by this modiﬁcation in
the assumption on banks’ screening technologies. In a pooling equilibrium with screening
(IE2), β-type bank is mimicking the α-type, by setting the loan approval probability to be
equal to pβ = 1−σγ. The less eﬃcient at screening bank can do so, although the pool of the
approved loans for this bank is obviously going to be worse than that of the more eﬃcient
at screening bank. The parameter range in which each of the four possible equilibria obtain




t t(1 − γ)
F
￿






1 − σγ(1 − α)
− 1 −
(1 + r0)σγ + γ(1 − σ)λd
1 − γ
(9)
Compared to the benchmark case of section 2.2, the equilibrium lending rate and the
number of banks that enter are both larger when the screening technology diﬀers across
banks.
2.4 Re-interpreting the benchmark as a pure adverse selection
model
This section considers the possibility that the default on a loan may be due to reasons other
than the strategic behaviour of a borrower. Suppose now that a borrower defaults because
the project for which he obtained the loan has turned out to be a bad project with an ex
post zero return. Now the parameter γ captures the proportion of borrowers whose projects
are worthless (have zero realized return). The type of the project determines the type of the
borrower and is borrower’s private knowledge, although the value of γ is publicly known.
As the loan is sunk in the zero-return project, the lender expects to get the liquidation
value of the project, 0 < d < 1, with probability λ. The screening technology of the bank
allows it to ﬁlter out “bad” projects from being ﬁnanced. A zero-return project is found
out by the screening technology with probability σ (similar to the benchmark case). As in
section 2.2, all banks here possess the same screening technology.
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p(1 + ri)(1 − γ) + pγλd + (1 − p)(1 + r0)
oi
(12)
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It is straightforward to establish that the same types of equilibria obtain in this pure
adverse selection version of the model as in the benchmark case, with one exception: the
parameter space that previously housed IE1 and HE equilibria in the benchmark case, now
only allows IE1. The qualitative results are therefore independent of whether the model
is interpreted as a strategic default setting (where some borrowers may choose to default
depending on the extent of loan contract enforcement) or pure adverse selection setting
(where loans made to bad projects will be defaulted on with certainty).10
10This agrees with the result in Milgrom (1987) on the equivalence of adverse selection and moral hazard
122.5 “Bad luck” setup without strategic default
Suppose now that instead of knowing their type before applying for a loan, borrowers learn
the type of their project—“good” project with return R > 1 or “bad” project with zero
return—only after making the investment. In other words, all borrowers are subject to
a bad shock (e.g. because the economy is doing worse than expected, etc) and screening
entrepreneurs/projects ex ante of loan approval is not possible (not informative). Assume
additionally that when investment returns are realized, it is costless for a lender to establish
the realized return (state falsiﬁcation is not possible). Then, choosing between approving
all loans or approving none, bank i compares the following two payoﬀs: Di(1−γ)(1+ri) and
Di(1+r0). Approving all loans results in a higher payoﬀ when γ < (ri−r0)/(1+ri), which
is similar to the threshold value ¯ γ obtained earlier in the benchmark case (to be precise, it
is exactly the same as with pure bad luck and absent any collateral, d = 0). Thus, the only
two possible equilibria here are IE1 and LE, in the notation of the benchmark section (but
note that IE1 replaces IE2 here because screening is not feasible in the current setting).
And the equilibrium is determined by the parameter γ.
3 Empirical Strategy, Data and Econometric Methods
The theoretical model indicates that a bank’s willingness to make new loans depends on
the proportion of opportunistic borrowers (or the proportion of low-productivity borrowers)
that it faces and on the extent of contract enforcement in the market in which it operates.
representations of asymmetric information.
13Overall, bank lending is increasing in the extent of contract enforcement and decreasing in
the proportion of opportunistic borrowers, but these eﬀects are not linear in the following
sense. For a given punishment technology facing a bank (a given d), the proportion of
opportunistic borrowers matters only when the extent of contract enforcement is below a
certain threshold level. Moreover, within this range, a small change in the extent of contract
enforcement has no eﬀect on bank behaviour. However, the threshold level will depend on
the characteristics of each loan contract; for example, an increase in the parameter d will
lower the threshold. These characteristics are not directly observable (at least in our data
set). If they vary across contracts, then for a given proportion of opportunistic borrowers,
a small change in the extent of contract enforcement can aﬀect the volume of loans, if
the change represents a crossing of the threshold for some group of contracts. By the
same token, a small diﬀerence in the extent of contract enforcement can aﬀect the impact
on loans of a change in the proportion of opportunistic or low-productivity borrowers.
Nevertheless, there will be an overall threshold level of the extent of contract enforcement
corresponding to the threshold for the most extreme set of technology parameters. Above
this level, neither improvements in contract enforcement nor changes in the proportion of
opportunistic or low-productivity borrowers have any eﬀect on loan volumes.11
11The model also suggests that there is a region in which banks will not lend at all. This is a rather
extreme situation which we do not expect to arise frequently in practice hence it may not lend itself to
econometric testing due to insuﬃcient observations. In our dataset, there are 85 observations for which
the loans-to-assets ratio is zero. The average regulatory quality is –0.27 while information on the default
rate is missing.
14These observations suggest the following empirical model for the volume of loans:
LAjt = α
0 + θ · DFjt + δ · RQjt + η · DFjt · RQjt | RQjt < RQ
∗
LAjt = α
1 | RQjt ≥ RQ
∗ (13)
where LAjt is the volume of loans made by the jth bank in period t (expressed as a fraction
of bank assets),12 DFjt is the default rate it faces and RQjt is the quality of the regulatory
environment in which it operates, which determines the extent of contract enforcement.
RQ∗ is some overall threshold level of RQjt. Greek letters represent parameters. In the
empirical application, we estimate the ﬁrst version of the model for both low and high
regulatory quality values, separately, and test the restriction of zero coeﬃcients (θ, δ and
η).
It is likely that we will also observe systematic variations in the volume of loans over
time (αt) and across banks (βj). (βj controls for variation in ﬁxed characteristics of banks
that may aﬀect their access to screening technology, and variation in ﬁxed characteristics
of the market in which they operate, such as country size.) There will also be completely
random variations in the volume of loans (ujt), because of unobservable shocks in the costs
that banks face. Perhaps there is also some persistence in the eﬀect of shocks. In this case,






0 · LAjt−1 + θ · DFjt + δ · RQjt +
12In Section 2, we assumed that the volume of bank assets remains ﬁxed, a simpliﬁcation which makes
the theoretical model more tractable; the theory does not explain variation in bank size. Normalization on
the volume of assets controls for this variation. Demetriades and Fielding (2010) explore the determinants
of bank assets in West Africa.
15+η · DFjt · RQjt + u
0







1 · LAjt−1 + u
1
jt | RQjt ≥ RQ
∗ (14)
Relevant annual panel data on individual African banks are available in Bank Scope for
1999–2008. However, for many banks observations of some variables are missing, so our
sample is limited to 378 banks in total.13 There is little information on the factors that
are likely to drive idiosyncratic variations in banks’ costs. However, one factor that we
can control for is the government’s share in the ownership of a bank (GVjt). The political
constraints facing a publicly owned bank may force it to lend more than a private bank.
For a given default rate, this eﬀect is likely to be mopped up by the bank-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀect βj, because ownership shares change very infrequently in our sample. However, if
government banks are relativelyinsensitive to loan default rates, then one ﬁnal modiﬁcation
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∗ (15)
LAjt is measured as the ratio of total loans by each bank, as indicated in Bank Scope,
expressed as a fraction of its total assets. DFjt is measured as the ratio of impaired loans
to total loans. It should be noted that DFjt does not measure exactly the same quantity
as the parameter γ in the theoretical model: γ captures the fraction of borrowers with the
potential to default, not the actual fraction of borrowers who do default. Unlike γ, DFjt
13Appendix B lists the countries in the dataset, and the number of banks in each country.
16is likely to be endogenous to bank behaviour: for example, it is likely to depend partly on
the eﬃciency with which loan applicants are screened. Consistent estimation of equation
(15) will therefore require the use of some set of instrumental variables, as discussed below.
RQjt is measured by the Regulatory Quality index for the country in which the bank
operates, as reported in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and
Mastruzzi 2009). Like all the other Governance Database indices, Regulatory Quality is
normalised so that the average world value in the base year is zero and the corresponding
standard deviation is unity.14
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics of all the variables, including a correla-
tion matrix. The mean of the loans to assets ratio is 50%, which is low by international
standards, conﬁrming the problem highlighted by the World Bank. This variable displays
substantial variation, ranging from a minimum value of 2% to a maximum value of 98%.
The default rate is also very high by international standards: it has a mean value of nearly
14% and varies between zero and 86%. Regulatory quality has a mean value of –0.45, which
is well below the world mean of zero and ranges between –2.4 and 0.95. The corresponding
standard deviation of 0.68 is much larger than in other regions of the world; for example,
the equivalent ﬁgure for the European Union is 0.43. The mean value of government share
is nearly 10%; 10 out of 378 banks are fully government owned throughout the sample
period, 149 are fully private. The mean growth rate is 2.5% with a minimum of –18.0%
14Other sources of data, such as the Doing Business surveys, provide more detailed information about
contract enforcement, but until very recently the coverage of African countries in these surveys has been
limited.
17and a maximum of 25%.
Table 3 reveals a correlation of 0.38 between the loans to assets ratio and regulatory
quality, an overall pattern consistent with our theoretical results. The correlation between
the default rate and the loans to assets ratio is 0.08, which indicates that overall rapid
growth in lending is associated with a slightly higher default rate. The growth rate and
regulatory quality are highly correlated with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.38, which is to be
expected. There is a smaller correlation of 0.07 between the loans to assets ratio and the
growth rate. Finally, government ownership and the default rate are positively correlated
with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.08.
The presence of the lagged dependent variable in the empirical model suggests dynamic
panel data estimation (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 1998). Both the
lagged dependent variable and the default rate are likely to be correlated with the error
term ujt. Rather than using a classical instrumental variable approach, we apply the
two-step GMM method suggested by Blundell and Bond. This involves imposing moment
conditions based on the assumption that for each t, ∆ujt is uncorrelated with higher-
order lags of LAjt, DFjt and DFjtGVjt, and similarly that ujt is uncorrelated with lags of
∆LAjt, ∆DFjt and ∆[DFjt · GVjt].15 In addition, bank age and RQjt, which are assumed
to be exogenous variables, are used as standard instruments for LAjt, DFjt and DFjtGVjt.
Given that two-step GMM standard errors are biased, we employ the Windmeijer (2005)
15This way of identifying the eﬀect of DFjt on LAjt will be valid so long as shocks to LAjt–for example,
shocks to the eﬃciency with which loans are screened–impact on default rates only with a lag, if at all.
Current lending decisions might aﬀect decisions to default in future years, but not in the current year.
18correction to obtain robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. We use a Sargan
Test to check the validity of the over-identifying restrictions in our model, along with
tests for ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation in ∆ujt.16 We also carry out a series of
robustness checks, including ﬁtting the model using a standard ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (with
instruments for the endogenous regressors).
With unbalanced panel data and few annual observations on some banks, we ﬁt several
versions of the model with diﬀerent values of RQ∗. Our main set of results reports the
results with RQ∗ = 0 (the mean value of the Regulatory Quality index for the whole
world). Subsequent regressions report results for diﬀerent values of RQ∗.
Finally, we note that the right hand side of equation (15) does not contain any measure
of aggregate economic activity in the country in which the bank operates. With the moral
hazard interpretation of the model, there is no particular reason why the loans-to-assets
ratio should depend on the aggregate level of economic activity. However, with the adverse
selection interpretation, it is possible that aggregate economic activity plays a role. The
magnitude of the adverse selection eﬀect might well depend on the number of proﬁtable
investment projects available: in periods of high economic growth there will be more op-
portunities, and fewer borrowers will default because of failed projects. In this case, adding
some measure of economic growth to the right hand side of equation (15) constitutes an
indirect test of whether the adverse selection or moral hazard interpretation of the model
16The Blundell-Bond estimator assumes that ujt is an IID error term, so the ﬁrst-order test should reject
the null of no autocorrelation because the diﬀerenced model has MA(1) errors. However, one should not
reject zero second-order serial correlation.
19is more likely. With adverse selection, higher economic growth should be associated with
a signiﬁcantly higher level of LAjt.
4 Empirical Results
Table 4 presents a set of baseline results for the whole sample, regardless of the level of
RQjt. Two versions of the model are reported, the ﬁrst of which excludes all interaction
terms, imposing the restrictions ζ = η = 0. The second version of the model allows for
an interaction term between the default rate and government ownership. The diagnostic
statistics reported in the table show no sign of model mis-speciﬁcation: the over-identifying
restrictions cannot be rejected; residual autocorrelation tests reject zero ﬁrst order serial
correlation but do not reject zero second order autocorrelation. The lagged dependent
variable is signiﬁcant in the regressions reported in the table, indicating that the choice of
a dynamic panel model is appropriate. The coeﬃcient on LAjt−1 is close to 0.5, implying
that the long run eﬀects of changes in other regressors are roughly twice as large as the
short run eﬀects. The quantitative results reported below relate to the eﬀects on impact.
Model 1 gives results consistent with our theoretical model. A percentage point increase
in the default rate reduces the loans to assets ratio by a little over 0.2 percentage points;
this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A unit increase in regulatory quality (an increase
equal to one standard deviation in the worldwide sample of governance variables) raises the
loans to assets ratio by nearly 5 percentage points; this eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
In Model 2, we see that the government ownership eﬀect is also statistically signiﬁcant.
20For a completely privately owned bank, a percentage point increase in the default rate
reduces the loans to assets ratio by over 0.3 percentage points; increasing the governments
ownership share by a percentage point reduces this eﬀect by 0.005 percentage points.17
Table 5 presents results obtained when we impose a ﬁnite value of RQ∗ and ﬁt the
equation for RQjt ≤ RQ∗ to a subset of observations. The table reports results for three
values of RQ∗: zero, +0.25 and –0.25. The sample size varies from 314 to 420. The lagged
dependent variable and the default rate are statistically signiﬁcant, and do not vary greatly
from one value of RQ∗ to another. Regulatory quality enterswith a small positive coeﬃcient
that is signiﬁcant for RQ∗ = 0 and RQ∗ = 0.25. The interaction term between government
ownership and the default rate is also small and positive, suggesting that the negative eﬀect
of the default rate is mitigated by government ownership. This term is, however, signiﬁcant
only at the 10% level for RQ∗ = 0 and RQ∗ = −0.25; it is insigniﬁcant for RQ∗ = 0.25.
The interaction between regulatory quality and the default rate is positive, ranging between
0.39 and 0.48; it is signiﬁcant at the 5% level for RQ∗ = 0 and RQ∗ = 0.25. Regulatory
quality mitigates, therefore, the negative eﬀect of the default rate. All three diagnostic
statistics are highly satisfactory throughout. Overall, the results in Table 5 provide strong
support for our theoretical predictions. In a weak regulatory environment, the default rate
has a substantial negative eﬀect on banks’ willingness to lend; this eﬀect is mitigated by
regulatory quality. Regulatory quality has a positive eﬀect on bank lending, an eﬀect that
17This means that for a bank completely owned by the government, the point estimate of the default
rate coeﬃcient is positive. However, this point estimate is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero with a p-value
of 0.25.
21is greater when the default rate is higher.
Table 6 presents results for RQjt > RQ∗, with RQ∗ = 0; results for the other values of
RQ∗ are similar. In Table 6, we do not impose zero coeﬃcients on RQjt and DFjt, but show
that the estimated coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The point estimate of
the default rate coeﬃcient is still negative, but much smaller than in the previous tables,
and only one standard error below zero. This is true regardless of whether regulatory
quality is included as a regressor. In other words, there is a threshold level of regulatory
quality above which small changes in regulatory quality, or in the default rate, have no
signiﬁcant impact on bank behaviour. In good regulatory environments the default rate
has no impact on bank lending, as predicted by our theoretical model. Note that the
insigniﬁcance of the default coeﬃcient in Table 6 is not a consequence of low variability
in the default rate in banks operating in a relatively good regulatory environment. The
standard deviation of DFjt when RQjt > 0 is 12.7 percentage points, which is only slightly
smaller than in the ﬁgure for the whole sample (13.9 percentage points).18 Default rates
in Africa do vary widely, even in a relatively good regulatory environment, but in such an
environment they appear not to aﬀect bank lending.
Finally, we check whether economic growth has a positive eﬀect on the loans to assets
ratio. The economic growth variable is intended to shed some light on whether the root
cause of African ﬁnancial underdevelopment is moral hazard or adverse selection. We
expect higher growth rates to lessen adverse selection but to have little or no eﬀect on moral
18Moreover, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean default rates between the cases in which RQjt < 0
and those in which RQjt > 0.
22hazard. When an economy is growing fast, the number of good projects will increase while
the number of opportunistic borrowers is unlikely to change. Table 7 reports an extension
of the ﬁrst model in Table 4, in which the rate of growth of GDP per capita in the country
in which the bank operates (GY ) is added as an additional regressor. We provide four
diﬀerent sets of estimates, which vary depending on the treatment of GY . Speciﬁcally,
we use contemporaneous or lagged values of GY and we treat both of them as exogenous
in the ﬁrst two regressions and as endogenous in the second two. In the latter case, as
we use system GMM, the instruments for GY are its own lagged values in the diﬀerenced
equation and lagged values of its ﬁrst diﬀerence in the levels equation. The results on the
signiﬁcance of GY are unfortunately not very clear, varying not so much by whether it is
treated as an endogenous or exogenous regressor but by whether we use contemporaneous
or lagged values of GY . When we use contemporaneous values, the growth rate is not
signiﬁcant. When we use lagged values, the GDP growth rate is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level if it is treated as an exogenous regressor. Its signiﬁcance, however, diminishes to the
10% level when it is treated as an endogenous regressor. It is perhaps more reasonable to
attach slightly more weight on the results in which the GDP growth rate is treated as an
endogenous variable. It is also perhaps more plausible to expect bank lending to respond
to the exogenous component of economic growth reasonably quickly. When a bank is
considering which projects to ﬁnance, current economic conditions and future prospects
are likely more important than last years economic conditions. In that sense, to the extent
that the growth rate is a good proxy for cyclical variations in investment opportunities,
the evidence indicates, albeit tentatively, that the more likely cause of African ﬁnancial
23underdevelopment is strategic loan defaults rather than the lack of good projects.
Robustness Checks
As we have shown in Table 5, the main results of the paper remain valid when using
alternative threshold values for RQ∗. Moreover, the main results remain valid if we remove
the time ﬁxed eﬀects.19 In Table 8 we report additional robustness checks involving the
use of a simpler estimator, namely ﬁxed eﬀects IV. Although this estimator is biased for
small T, we report it for comparison purposes. We report results for all countries and
separately for those with above or below RQ∗, for RQ∗ set at the world average level. The
instruments for the endogenous variables include regulatory quality and lagged values of
the endogenous variables (the lagged dependent variable and the default rate). Because
fewer instruments, lags and ﬁrst diﬀerences of the variables are used, the sample size is
somewhat larger compared to system GMM. In the all-countries results reported in column
1 of Table 8, the default rate is negative and highly signiﬁcant while regulatory quality is
positive but not signiﬁcant. In the sample that includes the countries with below world
average regulatory quality, the default rate remains negative and highly signiﬁcant with
a slightly higher coeﬃcient. In the sample of countries that have above world average
regulatory quality, the default rate remains negative but has a much smaller coeﬃcient in
absolute terms which is insigniﬁcant. Taken together these results provide conﬁrmation of
our main ﬁnding we obtained using system GMM—default rates are important only for
countries that have poor regulatory quality.
19These results are not reported in the interest of brevity but are availablefrom the authors upon request.
24Policy Analysis
Table 9 reports partial derivatives of the loans to assets ratio with respect to the default
rate and regulatory quality at various key points in the sample. The derivatives have been
calculated using the model in the ﬁrst column of Table 5, which corresponds to countries
that have below world average regulatory quality (i.e. RQ∗ = 0). Because of the presence
of the lagged dependent variable, these derivatives represent the short-run marginal eﬀects;
the implied long-run eﬀects are more than twice the size of the short-run ones.
Since the derivative with respect to the default rate varies with the extent of government
ownership, we report it for fully private and fully government owned banks (the fully
private bank is the median observation of government ownership in the sample) and at two
intermediate values between these two extremes. Because the same derivative also varies
with the degree of regulatory quality we report it at three diﬀerent levels in the sample (all
of which are of course below RQ∗): the sample mean of RQ∗, the median which at –0.32 is
slightly higher than the mean and the 25th percentile, which is –0.93.
For a fully private bank this derivative is –1.34 and is signiﬁcant at the 2% level; it
declines from –1.29 at the median RQ to –1.53 at the 25th percentile. At the other extreme,
for a fully government owned bank this marginal eﬀect has a lower value in absolute terms
of –0.92 at mean RQ. It is no longer signiﬁcant at the conventional 5% level, although it
is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. At the mean value of government ownership, the derivative
takes only slightly lower values than the corresponding ones for a private bank and has the
same signiﬁcance level. At 50% government ownership, the derivative increases to –1.13
25at mean RQ and to –1.32 at the 25th percentile RQ. Thus, it appears that the default
rate has a substantial impact on the loans to assets ratio, which is mitigated somewhat by
government ownership and regulatory quality. A reduction in the default rate by 1% for a
privately owned bank would increase the loans to assets ratio by 1.3 percentage points in
the short-run and by nearly 3.0 percentage points in the long-run. These are economically
large eﬀects suggesting that if default rates are reduced, bank lending can indeed take oﬀ,
even without additional savings mobilisation.
The partial derivatives of regulatory quality, which do not vary with government own-
ership, are reported for various values of the default rate. At the mean default rate (0.14),
the derivative has a value of 0.09 and is highly signiﬁcant. It declines to 0.07 at the median
default rate but remains signiﬁcant. At the 25th and 75th percentiles it stands at 0.05 and
0.11 respectively and remains highly signiﬁcant in both cases. An increase in the regulatory
quality index by 0.1 at the 75th percentile default rate increases the loans to assets ratio
by 1.1 per cent. An increase in the regulatory quality index by 0.1 at the 75th percentile
default rate increases the loans to assets ratio by 1.1 per cent in the short-run and by 2.5
per cent in the long-run. These numbers are both plausible and economically large.
5 Concluding Remarks
It has been suggested that the major factor explaining why most banks in Africa choose
to remain excessively liquid is a high loan default rate. We explore this conjecture in a
theoretical model based on moral hazard or adverse selection among borrowers, and ﬁnd
26that loan default matters when the quality of regulations guaranteeing contract enforcement
falls below a certain level. Estimation of an econometric model based on a dataset of African
banks conﬁrms this result: the importance of loan default as a factor inhibitingbank lending
depends on regulatory quality, but in a non-linear way. Above a certain threshold level of
regulatory quality, neither improvements in the default rate nor further improvements in
regulatory quality will increase bank lending.
These theoretical and empirical results are consistent with both a model based on moral
hazard (banks ﬁnd it diﬃcult to screen out opportunistic borrowers who have no intention
of repaying the loan) and a model based on adverse selection (banks ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
screen out borrowers with poor investment projects). However, we also ﬁnd evidence which
indicates that banks’ behavior is more or less invariant to the overall economic conditions
in which they are operating: when economic growth rises, banks do not lend a signiﬁcantly
larger fraction of their assets. If there is any correlation between economic growth and
the availability of proﬁtable investment projects, then this makes the adverse selection
explanation less likely.
Our ﬁndings are consistent with the presence of threshold eﬀects in the ﬁnance-growth
relationship found by macroeconomic studies such as Rioja and Valev (2004) and Deme-
triades and Law (2006). They suggest that a high propensity for borrowers to default does
not necessarily deter banks from lending: a suﬃciently rigorous regulatory environment
will promote a relatively high level of lending despite a high rate of default. In this dimen-
sion of economic development—as in others—institutional quality is the binding constraint
on the performance of the poorest African nations. Once countries have passed a certain
27threshold level of institutional quality, then a virtuous ﬁnance-growth cycle (an important
part of which is the market for bank credit) can be established.
28References
Allen, F., I. Otchere, and L. W. Senbetm (2010) ‘African ﬁnancial systems: a review.’
SSRN working paper id 1569613
Andrianova, S., P. Demetriades, and A. Shortland (2008) ‘Government ownership of banks,
institutions and ﬁnancial development.’Journal of Development Economics 85, 218–52
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991) ‘Some tests of speciﬁcation for panel data: Monte carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations.’ Review of Economic Studies
58, 277–97
Blundell, R., and S. Bond (1998) ‘Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic
panel-data models.’ Journal of Econometrics 87, 115–43
Demetriades, P., and D. Fielding (2010) ‘Information, institutions and banking sector de-
velopment in west africa.’ Economic Inquiry. forthcoming
Demetriades, P., and S. H. Law (2006) ‘Finance, institutions and economic development.’
International Journal of Finance and Economics 11, 245–60
Freixas, X., and J.-C. Rochet (1997) Microeconomics of Banking (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press)
Gries, T., M. Kraft, and D. Meierrieks (2009) ‘Linkages between ﬁnancial deepening, trade
openness and economic development: Causality evidence from sub-saharan africa.’
World Development 37(2), 1849–60
29Honohan, P., and T. Beck (2007) Making Finance Work for Africa (Washington, DC: The
World Bank)
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2009) ‘Governance matters viii: Aggregate
and individual governance indicators 1996-2008.’ The World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper 4978
Milgrom, P. (1987) ‘Adverse selectionwithout hidden information.’ Universityof California,
Berkeley, Working Paper 8742
Rioja, F., and N. Valev (2004) ‘Does one size ﬁt all?: A re-examination of the ﬁnance and
growth relationship.’ Journal of Development Economics 74, 429–47
Salop, S. (1979) ‘Monopolistic competition with outside goods.’ Bell Journal of Economics
10(1), 141–56
Windmeijer, F. (2005) ‘A ﬁnite sample correction for the variance of linear eﬃcient two-step
gmm estimators.’ Journal of Econometrics 126(1), 25–51
30Appendix A
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable name Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Observations Deviation Maximum
Loans to assets ratio (LA) 1639 0.496 0.203 0.024 0.982
Default rate (DF) 1639 0.136 0.153 0.000 0.860
Government share (GV ) 867 0.095 0.231 0.000 1.000
Regulatory quality (RQ) 1639 –0.446 0.682 –2.369 0.954
Growth rate (GY ) 1563 0.025 0.041 –0.177 0.254
Table 3: Correlation Matrix (832 observations)
Loans to assets ratio Default rate Government share Regulatory quality
(LA) (DF) (GV ) (RQ)
Default rate (DF) 0.084
Government share (GV ) –0.032 0.085
Regulatory quality (RQ) 0.380 0.035 0.007
Growth rate (GY ) 0.066 –0.020 0.081 0.375
31Table 4: Dynamic Panel Estimation of the Loans to Assets Ratio
All Banks, 1999–2008
Model 1 Model 2
Lagged dependent variable (LA−1) 0.498*** 0.594***
(standard error) (0.089) (0.083)
Default rate (DF) –0.208*** –0.337***
(standard error) (0.062) (0.131)
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 0.046* 0.062***
(standard error) (0.027) (0.019)
Government ownership (GV )× Default rate (DF) ÷ 10 0.050***
(standard error) (0.020)
Number of observations 847 491
Number of banks 195 110
Sargan test: number of restrictions 32 50
test statistic 39.97 50.38
(p-value) (0.16) (0.46)
Order 1 correlation test –4.46 –3.76
(p value) (0.00) (0.00)
Order 2 correlation test –1.05 –0.95
(p value) (0.29) (0.34)
Notes:
1. Estimationsare carried out in Stata 11.0using the xtdpd command. Two step estimates are reported.
2. GMM instruments include lags and ﬁrst diﬀerences of lags of the dependent variable and the default
rate(including interaction terms when present). Additional standard instruments for the diﬀerenced
equation include regulatory quality, bank age and time dummies.
3. All regressions include a full set of time dummies.
4. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors obtained using the Windmeijer WC-robust estimator.
5. The Null Hypothesis for the Sargan test is that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The test
statistic is distributed as χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions.
6. *** indicates a coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level; ** corresponds to
the 5% level and * the 10% level.
32Table 5: Dynamic Panel Estimation of the Loans to Assets Ratio
Countries with Poor Regulatory Quality (RQ ≤ RQ∗), 1998–2008
RQ∗ = 0 RQ∗ = 0.25 RQ∗ = −0.25
Lagged dependent variable (LA−1) 0.569*** 0.539*** 0.552***
(standard error) (0.092) (0.120) (0.105)
Default rate (DF) –1.168*** –1.294** –1.353***
(standard error) (0.479) (0.558) (0.592)
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 0.039** 0.042*** 0.020
(standard error) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019)
Government ownership (GV )× Default rate (DF) ÷ 10 0.042* 0.045 0.043*
(standard error) (0.025) (0.028) (0.026)
Regulatory quality (RQ)× Default rate (DF) 0.388** 0.436** 0.476*
(standard error) (0.196) (0.212) (0.261)
Number of observations 373 420 314
Number of banks 90 95 80
Sargan test: number of restrictions 64 65 64
test statistic 61.85 61.69 63.26
(p-value) (0.55) (0.59) (0.50)
Order 1 correlation test –3.13 –3.12 –2.80
(p value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Order 2 correlation test –1.02 –0.94 –1.06
(p value) (0.31) (0.35) (0.29)
Notes: See Table 4.
33Table 6: Dynamic Panel Estimation of the Loans to Assets Ratio
Countries with Good Regulatory Quality (RQ > RQ∗), 1998–2008
Model 1 Model 2
Lagged dependent variable (LA−1) 0.746*** 0.633***
(standard error) (0.126) (0.124)
Default rate (DF) –0.137 –0.119
(standard error) (0.131) (0.151)
Regulatory Quality (RQ) –0.045
(standard error) (0.051)
Number of observations 197 348
Number of banks 56 146
Sargan test: number of restrictions 31 43
test statistic 34.32 50.63
(p-value) (0.31) (0.20)
Order 1 correlation test 2.28 –2.82
(p value) (0.02) (0.00)
Order 2 correlation test 0.96 1.05
(p value) (0.33) (0.29)
Notes: See Table 4.
34Table 7: Dynamic Panel Estimation of the Loans to Assets Ratio
Including GDP Growth, All Banks, 1999–2008
Treatment of Growth Rate
Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous
Lagged dependent variable (LA−1) 0.540*** 0.559*** 0.497*** 0.591***
(standard error) (0.082) (0.077) (0.084) (0.071)
Default rate (DF) –0.197*** –0.213*** –0.178*** –0.220***
(standard error) (0.062) (0.060) (0.062) (0.057)
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 0.067*** 0.044* 0.052*** 0.040**
(standard error) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020)
GDP growth rate (GY ) –0.175 – 0.020 –
(standard error) (0.169) (0.144)
Lagged GDP growth rate – 0.418** – 0.551*
(standard error) (0.186) (0.294)
Number of observations 831 840 831 840
Number of banks 194 195 194 195
Sargan test: number of restrictions 32 32 50 50
test statistic 41.81 37.43 67.30 57.35
(p-value) (0.11) (0.23) (0.05) (0.22)
Order 1 correlation test –4.91 –4.80 –4.46 –4.75
(p value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Order 2 correlation test 0.66 –0.93 0.513 –0.91
(p value) (0.51) (0.35) (0.61) (0.36)
Notes: See Table 4.
35Table 8: Dynamic Panel Estimation of the Loans to Assets Ratio
Robustness Checks: Fixed Eﬀects IV Estimations
All countries RQ > 0 RQ < 0
Lagged dependent variable (LA−1) 0.179*** 0.253** 0.156*
(0.075) (0.128) (0.091)
Default rate (DF) –0.251*** –0.120 –0.306***
(0.097) (0.148) (0.118)
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 0.013 0.097** –0.003
(0.018) (0.045) (0.022)
Number of observations 1193 297 896
Number of banks 320 86 260
R2 (overall) 0.47 0.49 0.23
F-test 1.33 1.89 1.09
(p value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21)
Notes:
1. All regressionsreport resultswithout time dummies, which are statisticallyinsigniﬁcant.
2. Default rate and lagged loans to assets ratio are treated as endogenous variables. They are
instrumented by their lagged values.
3. Figures in parentheses under estimated coeﬃcients are standard errors.
4. The F-test tests the signiﬁcance of the bank ﬁxed eﬀects.
5. *** indicates a coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 1% level; ** corresponds to
the 5% level and * the 10% level.
36Table 9: Policy Analysis
Partial Derivates of the Loans to Assets Ratio
Per cent of government ownership
0% 9.6% 50% 100%
(mean)
A. Partial derivative with respect to
default rate at
mean RQ (–0.446) –1.341 –1.301 –1.131 –0.920
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09)
median RQ (–0.318) –1.291 –1.251 –1.081 –0.871
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.09)
25th percentile of RQ (–0.926) –1.530 –1.487 –1.317 –1.107
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08)
Default rate
B. Partial derivative with respect to 25th percentile median mean 75th percentile
regulatory quality at (0.031) (0.079) (0.136) (0.189)
0.051 0.070 0.092 0.112
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Notes:
1. The partial derivatives are estimated using the results reported in Table 5 with RQ∗ = 0.
2. Figures in parentheses are p-values for the test of statistical signiﬁcance of the marginal eﬀects.
37Appendix B: Data
The main source of the banking data is Bank Scope (Bureau van Dijk). The source of the
governance indicators is the World Bank.
Variable deﬁnitions (Source)
Loans-assets ratio: The ratio of loans to total assets (Bank Scope).
Default rate: the ratio of impaired loans to total loans (Bank Scope).
Government share: the percentage of shares owned by Government (Bank Scope).
Regulatory Quality: An index constructed by the World Bank capturing perceptions of the
ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that
permit and promote private sector development (Kaufmann et al. 2009).
38Table 10: Number of Banks in Each Country
Country Number Country Number Country Number
Algeria 2 Guinea 1 Niger 3
Angola 5 Guinea Biss. 1 Nigeria 60
Benin 7 Kenya 54 Rwanda 4
Botswana 11 Lesotho 3 South Africa 43
Cameroon 4 Liberia 1 Senegal 3
Cape Verde 4 Libya 2 Seychelles 1
C.A.R. 1 Madagascar 4 Sierra 1
Chad 3 Malawi 6 Sudan 3
Cote d’Ivoire 7 Mali 4 Swaziland 5
Egypt 5 Mauritiania 4 Togo 7
Eritrea 2 Mauritius 12 Tunisia 23
Ethiopia 8 Morocco 6 Zambia 11
Gabon 1 Mozambique 10 Zimbabawe 28
Ghana 11 Namibia 7
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